Jack Ubersax
Aluminum
- Joined
- Mar 5, 2005
- Location
- Wilbraham, MA
Lately there has been a lot of posting activity relative to this machine. Coincidentally, I came across some notes from a two day Sales Conference in October of 1981, devoted primarily to the introduction of this CNC machine. First, let's look at the W/S sales situation at that point in time.
During the mid-19 seventies, orders lost to competition were seriously climbing. Even in 1982, after the birth of this WSU-12, the W/S field sales force reported a total of 438 lost orders. Of those, 254 were lost to builders in Japan, and a full 113 of total lost orders were for machines of the 12" chuck size. The company could easily see the vital importance of getting a new 12" univeral machine onto the market ASAP.
Getting more serious about recapturing market share than probably ever before in its history, W/S focused on a strategy which it felt would make it a major producer of general purpose, high quality turning machines. Part of the objective was to have these new WSU-12 machines available within 90 days from reciept of purchase order! A deivery cycle rare in the history of the company, espcially in the NC and CNC slant bed machine era, but not at all unusual for the Japanese builders.
Also, the machine came on the market at the price of $129,200, base machine. Management expressed the philosophy "set the price low enough to make the foreign competition squirm a bit." To hold this so-called competitive price, plans called for a UMO, Universal Manufacturing Organizatioon structure, or a "plant within a plant" for the building of this machine. It would employ a line process, in which each machine would be built in exactly the same way. Target production was for 22 units per month from a dedicated staff of 62 people. Assemblers would be cross trained for emergency situations. It was visualized that 60% of all parts by volume would come from carefully selected and closely monitored vendors, in a competitve environment, to help control of costs.
High quality was a top priority for this new machine. "Freedom from Failure" was a term used. Many machines would leave the plant with hidden lectronic monitors, looking at such things as ball screw and spindle revs, real time on line, pumps, conveyor, power supply, etc. Field service would report all monitor data to HQ. Prior to shipping, every machine would be cycled a minimum of 8 hours under the monitoring of all functions. The Universal was to receive "more inspections per dollar than any prior machine."
To aid in the easy installation and rapid production use of the WSU-12, precision leveling of the machine was not required, as the bed constuction provided a three-point suspension arrangment. W/S Field Service personnel, almost all of whom were very experienced at this time, were given special training on this machine, and were audited with a new system for their installation techniques.
To further hold down manufacturing costs through the standardization process, the few available machine options were to be boxed for shipment with the machine and installed in the field. Customers could select from three standard machine colors, applied in the inline process.
I note with interest that field sales and service people were told not to "sell the assembly line" as customers might be unduly concerned about possible quality loss due to such a system.
The above represents only the highlights of my notes. I know little about the actual success of this machine in terms of total sales realized and its work in the field, as I sold only two of them (American Bosch) prior to taking early retirement. Perhaps others of you will continue this tale where I left off.
Thanks,
Jack
During the mid-19 seventies, orders lost to competition were seriously climbing. Even in 1982, after the birth of this WSU-12, the W/S field sales force reported a total of 438 lost orders. Of those, 254 were lost to builders in Japan, and a full 113 of total lost orders were for machines of the 12" chuck size. The company could easily see the vital importance of getting a new 12" univeral machine onto the market ASAP.
Getting more serious about recapturing market share than probably ever before in its history, W/S focused on a strategy which it felt would make it a major producer of general purpose, high quality turning machines. Part of the objective was to have these new WSU-12 machines available within 90 days from reciept of purchase order! A deivery cycle rare in the history of the company, espcially in the NC and CNC slant bed machine era, but not at all unusual for the Japanese builders.
Also, the machine came on the market at the price of $129,200, base machine. Management expressed the philosophy "set the price low enough to make the foreign competition squirm a bit." To hold this so-called competitive price, plans called for a UMO, Universal Manufacturing Organizatioon structure, or a "plant within a plant" for the building of this machine. It would employ a line process, in which each machine would be built in exactly the same way. Target production was for 22 units per month from a dedicated staff of 62 people. Assemblers would be cross trained for emergency situations. It was visualized that 60% of all parts by volume would come from carefully selected and closely monitored vendors, in a competitve environment, to help control of costs.
High quality was a top priority for this new machine. "Freedom from Failure" was a term used. Many machines would leave the plant with hidden lectronic monitors, looking at such things as ball screw and spindle revs, real time on line, pumps, conveyor, power supply, etc. Field service would report all monitor data to HQ. Prior to shipping, every machine would be cycled a minimum of 8 hours under the monitoring of all functions. The Universal was to receive "more inspections per dollar than any prior machine."
To aid in the easy installation and rapid production use of the WSU-12, precision leveling of the machine was not required, as the bed constuction provided a three-point suspension arrangment. W/S Field Service personnel, almost all of whom were very experienced at this time, were given special training on this machine, and were audited with a new system for their installation techniques.
To further hold down manufacturing costs through the standardization process, the few available machine options were to be boxed for shipment with the machine and installed in the field. Customers could select from three standard machine colors, applied in the inline process.
I note with interest that field sales and service people were told not to "sell the assembly line" as customers might be unduly concerned about possible quality loss due to such a system.
The above represents only the highlights of my notes. I know little about the actual success of this machine in terms of total sales realized and its work in the field, as I sold only two of them (American Bosch) prior to taking early retirement. Perhaps others of you will continue this tale where I left off.
Thanks,
Jack